President Coolidge took the unusual step of injecting national security concerns into a budget meeting, warning that America must find a 'middle path' between "extreme pacifism" and "militaristic attitude" — a pointed rebuke to both radical pacifists and hawks in Congress pushing for three additional Navy cruisers and expanded Army spending. Coolidge framed the argument in fiscal terms, insisting that reducing the public debt (which had dropped $2.34 billion in five years, exceeding targets by $2.09 billion) was itself a form of military preparedness. He also pointedly refused to support new military construction until an international arms limitation conference in Geneva had a chance to develop. The speech, delivered to business leaders at Memorial Continental Hall, also included Director H.M. Lord's sharp rebuke of excessive government letter-writing — a complaint so pressing the bureau formed an actual "correspondence club" to reduce bureaucratic paperwork.
This page captures a pivotal moment in 1920s American foreign policy: the tension between isolationist restraint and armed readiness that would define the next two decades. Coolidge's stubborn fiscal conservatism clashed with growing Congressional militarism as Japan expanded in Asia and European tensions simmered. The emphasis on debt reduction over armament reflected genuine national exhaustion after World War I and faith that prosperity could substitute for military buildup — a calculation that would prove catastrophic by 1941. The Geneva arms limitation conference represented a last, hopeful gasp of interwar disarmament efforts before the Great Depression and fascist rise made such conferences irrelevant.
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